Assessing Arms Makers' Corporate Social Responsibility by Byrne, Edmund F.
Assessing Arms Makers Corporate
Social Responsibility Edmund F. Byrne
ABSTRACT. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has
become a focal point for research aimed at extending
business ethics to extra-corporate issues; and as a result
many companies now seek to at least appear dedicated to
one or another version of CSR. This has not affected the
arms industry, however. For, this industry has not been
discussed in CSR literature, perhaps because few CSR
scholars have questioned this industrys privileged status as
an instrument of national sovereignty. But major changes
in the organization of political communities call tradi-
tional views of sovereignty into question. With these
considerations in mind I assess the U.S. arms industry on
the basis of CSR requirements regarding the environ-
ment, social equity, profitability, and use of political
power. I find that this industry fails to meet any of these
four CSR requirements. Countering a claim that these
failings should not be held against arms manufacturers
because their products are crucial to national defense, I
contend that many of these companies function not as
dutiful agents of a nation-state but as politically powerful
entities in their own right. So, I conclude, they should be
held responsible for the foreseeable consequences that
flow from use of their products. This responsibility should
include civil liability and, in cases involving war crimes
and violations of human rights, responsibility under
international human rights standards.
KEY WORDS: corporate social responsibility, arms
industry, liability, human rights
Introduction
Over the last century in and beyond the United States
large corporations attained almost complete auton-
omy in law and in cultural understandings as well
(Cray and Drutman, 2005). Prominent abuses of this
insularity led to the emergence of business ethics,
which has focused on moral issues within the
boundaries of a corporate entity. But some business
ethicists take the social and political context into ac-
count as they assert stakeholders rights or call for so-
cially responsible investing (SRI) and/or corporate
social responsibility (CSR). Scholars differ regarding
what kinds of issues should be included under CSR
but they have considered the following aspects of a
companys business activities: how well it maximizes
profit, satisfies social demands, honors ethical values,
and uses political power (Garriga and Mele´, 2004), and
how well it protects the environment and complies
with legal constraints (Carroll, 1991; Collins and
Porras, 2002; Gettler 2005). Taken together, these
various approaches to CSR reach beyond laissez faire.
But views as to how bound management should be by
CSR norms range from mandatory and enforced to
hortatory and discretionary. Whence various critiques
and corrective proposals.
Some cite empirical data to raise doubts about the
efficacy of CSR (Heath and Norman, 2005; Vogel,
2005;). Others focus on the way some companies
turn CSR into a public relations coup (Kapelus,
2004); and in so doing they invite cynical evaluations
of the movement (Crook, 2005; Doane, 2005;
Mokhiber and Weissman, 2005). Attempting to
obviate flaws in CSRs efficacy, some scholars pro-
pose criteria for determining if a companys claim to
CSR is legitimate (Graafland et al., 2004; Pava and
Krausz, 1997); another ties the efficacy of CSR to
‘‘stakeholder activism’’ in ‘‘a responsible society’’
(Jeurissen, 2004), and another, to a global agreement
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(Hopkins, 2003). Corporate leaders respond to this
learned discourse by signing such declarations of
principle as the UN Global Compact, 1999, which
now has several hundred signatories, or the ‘‘Global
Corporate Citizenship’’ joint statement signed by
twenty-four MNCs in New York in 2002. They
also support the annual Dow Jones Sustainability
Index (DJSI), which includes special criteria for
companies such as armaments manufacturers whose
artefacts cause foreseeable and preventable harm (see
also Gowri, 2004; Hopkins, 2003, pp. 154–156).
These developments notwithstanding, few if any
CSR studies address the arms industry directly. This
lacuna is due in part to the issues built-in oxymoron
(Baker, 2005) but far more, I believe, to centuries-
old assumptions about political sovereignty, includ-
ing the nation-states absolute authority and
responsibility regarding war and weapons. Left
unchallenged, these assumptions exonerate the arms
industry of all responsibility for what is done with its
products. But an appeal to sovereignty should not
exempt the arms industry from CSR because, as
critical international relations scholars tell us, the
paradigmatic nation-state with absolute sovereignty
is quite recent in historical terms and may become a
null class (Linklater, 1998; see also Matten et al.,
2003), even as the quasi-sovereignty of MNCs is
increasing (Cray and Drutman, 2004, 2005) and
causing negative externalities.1 So it is encouraging
that peace-oriented NGOs are attempting to de-
velop both CSR criteria and international laws of
human rights into legally binding norms.
Arms industry actors are well aware of this nor-
mative agenda, but they see themselves as being
outside the purview of CSR. Corroborating this
view is the fact that their harm-facilitating business
enjoys the collaboration, endorsement, and gener-
osity of its principal customer, that is, government.
This has been the situation since organized political
entities began warring against one another to
determine which powers will control which parts of
the world (Porter, 1994, ch. 4). Such government
reliance on military might became a defining char-
acteristic of the arms industry during the wars of the
twentieth century; and since the Cold War the
industry has become a paradigm of corporate dom-
inance. From within the socially constructed world
of a nation-state, however, the traditional concept of
absolute sovereignty retains its hold. In such a world
it is hard to get a hearing for any claim that an
industry devoted to ‘‘national defense’’ could pos-
sibly be involved in fundamentally (not just inci-
dentally) unethical activity.
This Hobbesian ideology fails on its own terms
because (a) the primary beneficiaries of nation-state
arms procurement are not citizens needing protec-
tion but private corporations needing revenue and
(b) many weapons are neither sold to nor used by
nation-states. To show the moral significance of
these assertions I will assess the CSR status of the
arms industry, especially in the United States, with
regard to (1) environmental quality, (2) social equity,
(3) profitability (EORM, n.d.; Goldberg, 2001;
Zwetsloot, 2003), and especially (4) use of political
power (Hopkins, 2003; Hopkins and Hopkins,
2002). This assessment will show that arms industry
products cause negative externalities to planet and
people and that their weapons businesses are prof-
itable only because of amoral government priorities
that the industry fosters and largely controls. My
conclusion: corporations in this industry violate
CSR standards and for this reason are not entitled to
unfettered autonomy but should be made subject to
appropriate legal constraints (see Davis, 1960). This
means that arms manufacturers should be held liable
for foreseeable negative externalities brought about
by users of their weapons if these involve violations
of human rights.
In working through this agenda, I will at times
appeal to a distinction between Westphalian and
post-Westphalian political arrangements. The mean-
ing of these terms should become clearer from their
use in various contexts. For now it suffices to indicate
that their meanings derive from the Treaty of West-
phalia (1648) which set in motion a political process
that deems nation-states to be sovereign entities sin-
gularly empowered to use and control violence.
Though still canonical for most political scientists, this
Westphalian doctrine is no longer relevant to many
types of organized political violence, thus inviting
introduction of the term post-Westphalian.
The arms industry would fail a CSR
environmental requirement
Weapons of war harm environments into which
they are introduced. Under some possible set of
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circumstances they could conceivably benefit the
environment, though I fail to see how. Someone
might also assert that war-caused harm to the
environment might not be irreversible. It is difficult
to imagine, though, that anyone would seriously
claim that no military weapon harms the environ-
ment.
The extent of environmental damage a weapon
might cause depends in large measure on the level of
military technology it involves together with a
claim, now refuted, that the environment has no
owner so may be used at no cost. Moreover, the
scope of harm caused by a weapon extends beyond
the effects of its actual use in war to numerous places
where it is produced, tested, stored, or disposed of.
Few would dispute that each of these activities in
connection with nuclear weapons has had devastat-
ing effects on the environment. Chemical and bio-
logical weapons are no less problematic (Harigel,
2001; Mnutsakanian, 1997). Artillery testing has also
done catastrophic damage to numerous ecologically
precious sites including a once beautiful island in
Puerto Rico, nature preserves in South Africa, a lake
used by migratory birds in Quebec, and large areas of
Panama, Nevada, and Cape Cod in Massachusetts.
Military organizations as well as their supporting
agencies, e.g., the US Department of Energy, rarely
disclose data about these matters. But some private
groups have reported the environmental conse-
quences of weaponry in some detail (Ardley and
Grant, n.d.; Brauer, 2000; Peluso and Watts, 2001;
Savage, 2000; Wagner, 2003); and some public funds
are now being expended, e.g., by the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency, to restore weapon-
devastated areas (see also Garie´py, 2001).
Unlike the large weapons systems that technol-
ogy has made available over the last several cen-
turies, small arms and even conventional weapons
might not cause irreversible environmental harm.
But this is a factual issue. The question of principle
is whether any arms manufacturer or trader should
be held liable for demonstrable environmental
degradation that can be traced directly to the
weapons it makes or sells. I respond to this in the
affirmative, provided that those engaged in arms
transfers know or should know that their products
are hostile to the environment, e.g., by making it
uninhabitable or accessible only at great risk. Both
because of and apart from these consequences,
though, is the direct impact of ‘‘collateral damage’’
on human beings, namely, that weapons used
militarily often violate human rights, sometimes
catastrophically.
The arms industry would fail a CSR social
equity requirement
Most proponents of SRI and of versions of CSR that
recognize the validity of stakeholder theory require
that a corporations products and services not inflict
harm unduly on people in societies where they are
situated. This includes points of origin but must
include points of arrival as well. A globalized per-
spective is especially appropriate with regard to the
US arms industry, because it seeks to apply every-
where the individualist interpretation of a right to
bear arms that already obfuscates moral assessments
of corporate liability in the United States. So as
applied to the arms industry the CSR social equity
requirement must take ‘‘local’’ to mean any place
where this industrys products are located. For,
horribly detrimental wars are currently being fought
in many places with arms typically provided from
afar.
In these conflicts international standards of war-
fare are of limited use; so there is need for additional
norms that will extend protection on an emergency
basis to those who are most vulnerable in these
conflicts, especially civilians and indentured child
soldiers. This is clearly the position of organizations
seeking to maintain and expand civil society as a
counter-force to government prerogatives. It is also
the position of many corporations, at least with re-
gard to their own workplaces. In keeping with the
old maxim about what is good for goose and gander
respectively, I offer some data relevant to this
observation.
Later I will discuss national defense and cost-
benefit arguments for military expenditures in the
US. These arguments apply only tangentially,
however, to the small arms bazaar. For this special-
ized trade in killing implements is not easily vindi-
cated by an appeal to national defense. An attempt is
made to do just that of course, by claiming, ‘‘it is
better to fight them over there rather than here.’’
But the egocentric reasoning at work here rarely
suffices to justify the negative externalities such wars
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unleash. Similarly, an appeal to commercial benefits
is consequentially invalidated by the human rights
violations these weapons help bring about. Consider,
then, the weapons at issue and the effects of using
them.
Small arms include handguns, carbines, assault
rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, light mortars, and
shoulder-fired missiles. There are presently an esti-
mated 500–550 million small arms in circulation
around the world. Spokespersons for the arms
industry contend that caveat emptor should govern
this proliferation of weapons, as though what is at
issue is nothing more serious than the occasional
misuse of an inherently wholesome product. This
see-no-evil approach to merchandised mayhem is
personified by such arms profiteers as Samuel
Cummings, Victor Bout (Farah and Braun, 2006),
and Gus van Kouwenhoven, whose modus operandi
is fictionalized in the film Lord of War (2005). To
market this business globally the National Rifle
Association (NRA) has apparently been earning
enough from sellers to overcome its onetime budget
deficit estimated at $100 million (Goldring, 1999;
Morton, 2006; NYT, 21 Dec. 2003; Econ, 8 May
1998).2 Though these weapons account for only
$10 billion worth of the $850 billion/year of mili-
tary expenditures, the costs incurred by their use are
overwhelming.
One cost is surely the support these weapons give
to buyers who are fighting a small war and for whom
such wars are a way of life, a business. As described
by William D. Hartung,
More often than not, todays wars are multi-sided af-
fairs in which militias, gangs, and self-anointed ‘‘re-
bels’’ engage in campaigns of calculated terror, civilian
targets are fair game, and the laws of war are routinely
ignored... (This is) a new post-Cold War model of
‘‘rebellion,’’ a form of irregular warfare that can be
sustained without a big-power patron and frequently
without the support of the majority of the people in
the target nation... (It is, in effect,) war as plunder
(2001, pp. 80, 81).
A second cost consists of the fact that the easy
availability of small arms facilitates conflicts,
heightens their severity and longevity. Small arms,
moreover, are involved far more often in violations
of human rights and humanitarian laws than are such
major conventional weapons systems as planes and
helicopters (Singer, 2003, pp. 54–56). Indeed,
according to one study, small arms were the only
weapons used in 46 of 49 major conflicts in the
1990s, in which 80–90% of those killed were civil-
ians (as compared to 5% in WW I), and are the single
most important cause of the upsurge in refugees
(Klare, 1999). Because small arms are comparatively
light, they can be used by children, of whom over
300,000 under the age of 18 are now serving as
soldiers (London, 2005, p. 1).
Appalled by these data, a large coalition of NGOs
is seeking to stem the tide of human rights violations,
including those involving the use of small arms. At
the Ottawa Convention in 1997 this coalition pre-
sented a treaty banning landmines, which many
nations (not including the US) have signed. And it
has since moved on to address other contributors to
unjustifiable bloodletting capability. It is now seek-
ing regulations that will hold accountable for human
rights violations (1) recipient users of the arms, (2)
individuals who engage in transferring them, and (3)
governments that authorize the transfers.
Recipients who are extreme violators can be
brought before an international court of justice; but
efforts to further limit individual users has been
blocked by US insistence that the right to bear arms
is sacrosanct (NYT, 28 June 2006 ). Other proposals
would apply human rights criteria to arms traders if
they violate arms embargoes or engage in actions
proscribed under such criminal law concepts as
command responsibility and complicity (CHD,
2006; Misol, 2004; Wood, 2006). Perhaps eventually
governments will be held accountable under inter-
national law for authorizing arms transfers that can
reasonably be expected to result in violations of
human rights; but not yet. In 1991 an NGO coali-
tion began a ‘‘Control Arms’’ campaign to bring
about a small arms trade treaty. Many countries were
prepared to sign this treaty at a UN conference in
2006; but NRA personnel held all three US
appointments at this conference and severely dis-
torted the UNs objective in an extensive media
campaign (CDI, 2006). No treaty was signed.
Even if it had been signed, it would have been just
one step towards a world in which committing acts
of violence is not a protected right. Legal frame-
works for such a world are being developed; their
implementation will take time. Meanwhile, certain
non-state actors already ban possession and use of
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weapons in places they control. These are corpora-
tions, including some that are engaged in arms
production. Some companies prohibit employees
from having weapons on site without explicit per-
mission.3 Some ban weapons outright with no
mention of exceptions, and some even extend their
ban beyond their proprietary premises.4 At least one
arms manufacturer, General Dynamics (n.d., p. 16)
bans weapons on its premises, whereas firearms
producer Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. (n.d.)
apparently does not.
Some corporations, then, do ban weapons; and
bills are pending in some states in the US to make
such bans mandatory. Meanwhile, gun rights orga-
nizations such as the NRA are actively lobbying state
governments to invalidate workplace weapons bans.
These organizations fail to realize, apparently, that
such bans are based on the very foundations of
capitalism, namely, ownership and property rights.
Moreover, the entities imposing these bans are not
just ordinary owners they are politically powerful
organizations that may have wealth and influence
greater than many nation-states. As such, they
exemplify a major component of a post-Westphalian
world: politically powerful non-state actors. So
perhaps the way they restrict access to weapons
where they are in control should be emulated by
other actors, both state and non-state, who have no
less of a need to protect their interests and their
people. Such restrictions would be fully in accord
with traditional Westphalian understandings; but as
it happens these understandings may not always
coincide with the quest for profit.
The arms industry would fail a CSR
profitability requirement
Considering the multi-billion dollar revenues some
defense contractors generate, it might seem foolish
to contend that the arms industry is not profitable.
But to a great extent this industry depends for its
working capital on the continuous input of gov-
ernment funds obtained from taxpayers and credi-
tors. Indeed, this has for centuries been a defining
characteristic of companies dedicated to providing
military needs, so much so that the history of taxa-
tion is inseparable from that of warfare (Porter, 1994,
esp. pp. 114–118). So if one takes profitability in its
usual sense as a favorable return on investment in,
development and marketing of goods and/or ser-
vices, then the arms industry is not profitable. This
being the case, a consistent free-market conservative
who eschews managerial responsibility for any CSR
objective other than profit (Henderson, 2005) would
be disappointed. A Keynesian economist, though,
might interpret the industrys government subsidies,
as pump priming that might not be fatal to a claim of
profitability. But, technical issues aside, a Keynesian
economist would endorse intervention in the
economy only if it is done in a way that improves
societal well-being. So can one excuse the arms
industry for not complying with the CSR profit-
ability requirement because the industrys goods and
services are the sine qua non of national defense?
This line of reasoning appeals to some, of course, but
it is faulty, as can be seen by considering how poorly
the arms industry complies with the CSR require-
ment that companies use political power equitably.
The arms industry would fail a CSR use
of political power requirement
Arms industry output is friendly neither to the natural
environment nor to social equity, and can be con-
sidered profitable only by ignoring what historians
call the triad of army, taxes, and bureaucracy (Porter,
1994, pp. 116–118). The issue, then, is whether these
failings can be discounted because weapons providers
are inseparable from government and its purportedly
sovereign responsibilities. The long historical inter-
dependence of nation-states and weapons makers
(Porter, 1994, chs. 5–7) supports the inseparability
claim. But (1) arms makers today are not just docile
servants of a nation-state and (2) to claim that they are
requires endorsing a Westphalian worldview that has
become increasingly problematic.
Such objections, of course, fail to impress anyone
who takes it for granted that an arms industry should
be tied to a major political power because the latter
needs its products to fulfill its global ‘‘responsibili-
ties.’’ A government thus exploiting peoples
resources to fund national defense can no doubt
retain peoples support provided they concur as to
the identity of enemies and the need to fight them
with weapons the arms industry provides. But if a
declared enemy is neither a nation-state nor readily
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associable with a nation-state, Westphalian assump-
tions are less applicable, and political theorists begin
talking about, say, ‘‘asymmetrical’’ conflicts.
Historically, the concept of ‘‘national defense’’
presupposed a Westphalian world in which nation
states fight one another each purportedly to protect
citizens for whom it is responsible. Throughout the
era of colonization, of course, established nation-
states sought to dominate people in places not
deemed sovereign, and this continued during and
after World War II (Porter, 1994, pp. 145–146).
During the Cold War the West routinely subordi-
nated smaller nations claims to sovereignty to the
global task of containing communism. To this end it
treated the Soviet Union as an expansionary
monolithic state seeking full control of places far
removed from Russia or even its satellite countries.
This bipolar worldview provided a credible West-
phalian rationale for production and selective
distribution of major weapons systems directly or
indirectly under US control but put to use wherever
a threat was identified.
Today, by contrast, the US proclaims its enemy to
be not a super-state like the USSR but a stateless
modus operandi whose base of operations may be
anywhere. Purportedly in response to this threat, the
US government seems committed to achieving and
maintaining military supremacy in the world. Given
this agenda, it is becoming more dependent on the
arms industry than ever. And this situation, it would
seem, undercuts the inseparability assumption and
opens the contractor to CSR responsibilities. But
since the Cold War ended, the US government has
increasingly overlooked such responsibilities as it
acquiesces in corporate priorities. To this end it is
pursuing fiscal policies that risk engendering a major
financial crisis. So why do American taxpayers let
their government expose them to such great risk?
Two reasons predominate: lack of genuine
democracy and lack of relevant information. A third
is fear – not rational fear of quantifiable dangers to
peoples well-being, but a deliberately inculcated
fear that enables the US government to fund the
arms industry on a level that surpasses what all other
countries combined spend on their ‘‘national de-
fense.’’5 This fear cannot be based on generic or
hypothetical worries indefinitely, of course, but
must eventually be tied to specific occupants of the
world who are identified as enemies, meaning
threats to US national security. Since the day in 2001
when non-state actors attacked a military and a
corporate symbol of Americas capitalist hegemony,
the US government has claimed for itself just such
identifiable enemies. It peremptorily called them
terrorists, declared war on terrorism, and began
carrying out long-planned encroachments on na-
tion-states in the guise of fighting terrorism (Byrne,
2004, 2005; Dreyfuss, 2006). Congress dutifully
endorsed open-ended funding of this war, and the
media (with a few exceptions) dutifully adopted the
supportive antiterrorism rhetoric without pausing to
reflect. Reflection, however, is very much in order.
In this climate of manufactured opinion, only a
few commentators (e.g., Mueller, 2006) have ques-
tioned the motives behind or the targets of this
policy of spending the nations wealth on weapons.
Nor have many called attention to the inconsistent
approach to justifying weapons procurement on the
basis of assumptions that are alternatively Westpha-
lian (against states that harbor terrorists) and post-
Westphalian (against terrorists who are non-state
actors). Or that this was already being done during
the Cold War era. For, then as now it was primarily
the interests of certain private corporations rather
than people near and far away that was being pro-
tected (Cousins, 1987). A full account of this history
is beyond the scope of this essay; but my claim about
the principal beneficiaries can be partially supported
by recalling a moment in the history of US ‘‘de-
fense’’ spending when some elected officials called
that spending into question: the end of the Cold
War.
The end of the Cold War quickly deflated the
moralistic anti-communism raison-detre for US
arms expenditures. At first arms manufacturers had
no adequate response to the ethically appealing call
for a ‘‘peace dividend’’ that would shift resources
from weaponry to civilian priorities. As George
Kennan had predicted, though (in Cousins, 1987,
pp. 11–13), they were soon concocting new ratio-
nales. Not until the emergence of the open-ended
war on terrorism a decade later, though, would there
be another such cornucopian rationale. Recall, then,
how anti-communism once played this role and then
became ineffective.
World War I and especially World War II turned
some US businesses into massive providers of
military supplies and services (Cousins, 1987; Porter,
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1994, ch. 7) – what President Eisenhower famously
labeled a ‘‘military-industrial complex.’’ Its mission
was to spend government money to defend capi-
talism while its foe spent a comparable amount in
defense of communism. In practice this meant
holding on to, and where possible bringing addi-
tional, territory under its dominion. To this end,
each foe designed, tested, publicly funded, and built
such technologically advanced weapons as elec-
tronically sophisticated warplanes, plutonium man-
ufacturing plants, variably sited launching platforms,
and espionage telecommunications. Meanwhile hot
wars were fought primarily in less developed
countries: 125 different wars between 1945 and
1991, resulting in the death of 40 million people,
mostly civilians (Saul, 1992, pp. 141, 599). Why?
In large part to help the superpowers as well as
lesser powers determine who would control which
strategic oil reserves, minerals, shipping lanes, mil-
itary bases, and UN votes. These endeavors led
largely to standoffs, and so also did the quest for
technological superiority. In any event, the two
superpowers were carrying a combined annual debt
of $600 billion when the Cold War ended (Dean
and Clausen, 1988, p. 1). Who benefitted from this
indebtedness? In the US, it was the weapons
industry, at the expense of many people who were
either taxed for or targeted by these weapons.
The principal Cold War era buyer of US-made
weapons was the US government. The enemy was
clearly identified, and weapons systems, including
the Strategic Defense Initiative, were designed and
targeted with ‘‘containment’’ in mind (Brody,
1987). To this end, many weapons had to be dis-
tributed to subservient defenders of US interests.
This widespread provision of weapons was greatly
accelerated in the 1960s when ex-Ford Motor
Company CEO Robert McNamara used first DOD,
then the World Bank to ‘‘rationalize’’ the US arms
industry by maximizing production and selling
‘‘uniform’’ surplus to developing countries, largely
on credit. This practice created a monetary crisis
the response to which was to replace the Bretton
Woods gold standard with a floating US dollar
(Hobsbawm, 1994, pp. 473–474; Saul, 1992,
pp. 81–99, 406–409). In the 1980s the global arms
manufacturing industry, mostly in advanced capi-
talist countries, approached $1 trillion per year in
sales; some $140 billion of this total went to less
developed countries, with over half going to Middle
East countries alone, especially Iraq and Saudi
Arabia.
In the US, the Reagan administration excoriated
communism in its rhetoric as it vastly expanded the
weaponry-related budget. Defense contractors vied
with one another for lucrative contracts, and over
time developed complex illegal procedures to obtain
and swap classified DOD plans and priorities on
which they based their proposals. This endemic
culture of illegality was eventually exposed, and a
number of document thieves were convicted. For
the sake of the supposed national interest, though,
no contractors special relationship with the Penta-
gon was suspended for any length of time (Pasztor,
1995).
In carrying out this ‘‘rearmament’’ program the
US authorized exporting weapons almost every-
where, as did the other permanent members of the
UN Security Council: France, China, Russia, and
the UK. Together these countries (each of which has
nuclear weapons capability) would supply 86% of all
weaponry sold to poor countries in 1988–1992.6 But
when the Cold War justification for defense
spending came to an abrupt end, defense contractors
had to face steep cuts in their revenues. Just days
before the Gulf War began, for example, the US
government cancelled a $57 billion A–12 aircraft
program on which defense contractors McDonnell-
Douglas and General Dynamics had been counting
for a sizable part of their income. This setback,
moreover, was symptomatic of the industrys overall
diminution:
Where in 1985 the Pentagon had 497 aircraft weapons
systems procurements, that number is just 55 today
[1994]. For helicopters, the number has plummeted
from 355 to 72 over the same period. Defense outlays,
as a percentage of GDP, are projected to slip from
4.2 percent in 1994 to 2.9 percent in 1999. Broader
social and economic trends will likely only accelerate
this decline (Munro, 1994).
In 1990, when the DOD had $300 billion in its
coffers, one think tank predicted the DOD budget
would fall by a third by the year 2000, and another
said the government could save $500 billion during
the1990s ‘‘if the military [services] competition
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were replaced by a cooperative reduction of arma-
ments’’ (Kaufman, 1991, p. 47). Congressional
budget makers took such ideas into account, and the
arms business declined. So US military leaders began
stressing external threats, including that posed by
weapons systems already provided to potential
problem countries,7 keeping supply lines open, and
providing some global police service. They backed
this up with seven scary eventualities, mostly asso-
ciated with developing countries (Daly and Cobb,
1994, pp. 336–56; BW, 14 Jan. 1991, 3 Sept. 1990).
And they tied continued military production to dual
use and job preservation (both considered below).
Such reasons in time prevailed, as sales to buyers in
developing countries grew over the next decade to
the point that they now account for well over 50%
of all arms transfer agreements made globally
(Grimmett, 2005), regardless of all the challenges to
human rights that this entails (Berrigan and Hartung,
2005). Meanwhile, defense contractors have been
reinventing themselves through mergers and
downsizing and have given more attention to
commercial products.8 I will illustrate these
maneuvers in connection with Boeing Aircraft, but
consider first how expansion of the dual use doctrine
helped arms businesses adapt.
A dual-use technology is by definition developed
for and identified with a military use but can also be
used for a non-military purpose. The Internet is an
example. So too is high resolution spy-satellite
technology which, though developed by the Cold
War principals to secretly keep track of one anothers
activities, can also be used to upgrade mapmaking,
monitor environmental change, climate, narcotics,
and immigration, and precisely position anything
from commercial aircraft to a good place to catch
fish. With this flexible usage in their marketing
vocabulary, the Russians began selling their state-of-
the-art products to any buyer; and American defense
contractors wanted to do the same. The Soviet
Unions disintegration, though, diminished the
incentive of many established consumers of US
weapons to continue buying,9 and the US govern-
ment still wanted to regulate weapons sales to suspect
buyers. So US providers began emphasizing non-
military uses of their products and calling for ‘‘higher
fences on fewer products,’’ with the latter to con-
stitute a ‘‘core list.’’ But they still lacked a free
market because of a mechanism the Western allies
had established to control arms trade with the
communist bloc.
This mechanism, known as the Coordination
Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CO-
COM), had been set up in 1949 to monitor exports
to countries behind the Iron Curtain. Then in 1991
COCOM loosened restrictions on imports into the
old Soviet Union, and a year later enrolled Soviet
successor states in the export control system.
Decontrolled commodities came to include all but
the most sophisticated computers, advanced machine
tools and telecommunications; and the list of pro-
hibited goods remained subject to ‘‘rapid moderni-
zation.’’ Meanwhile companies involved in
exporting dual use technologies increasingly ne-
glected to request government authorization, even as
impatient purchasers began looking elsewhere,
especially to Europe, for military hardware. In re-
sponse DOD became more attentive to the interests
of home-based manufacturers. COCOM was abol-
ished in 1992; and in 1994 thirty-three co-founding
countries, including Russia and some of its former
satellites, signed the Wassenaar Arrangement, a
voluntary regime of after-the-fact reports on con-
ventional arms sales (semi-annually) and sales of
dual-use technologies (frequency depending on the
sensitivity of the items sold and to whom).
This loosening of arms trade constraints is hardly
all-inclusive, of course, by virtue of other treaty and
statutory regimes pertinent to US arms exports. The
US signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(effective 1970), as have 188 other nation-states.
And within the US numerous statutes are in place to
regulate munitions exports, including in particular
the Arms Export Control Act, which provides for
State Department oversight of defense articles and
services, and the Export Administration Act of 1979,
which provides for Department of Commerce
oversight of dual-use goods, software, and technol-
ogy (some 12,000 applications per year). Three
major lists of controlled items that establish licensing
regimes are also in place – the Commerce Control
List, the United States Munitions List, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Controls – and
these are supplemented with ad hoc oversight pro-
visions (US Department of State, n.d.). But not even
nuclear nonproliferation has been enforced uni-
formly towards all developing countries. Recently,
for example, the worlds principal possessors of
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nuclear weapons threaten Iran and North Korea for
seeking nuclear proficiency, but not Pakistan or
India (not to mention Israel). Meanwhile, many
non-nuclear weapons have been sold and distributed
around the world; and controls on this trade are
increasingly conspicuous by their absence. This can
be seen from the following examples.
1. The International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program was set up to
introduce potential weapons users to available
products on a try-before-you-buy basis. If as
is often the case a participating country is
short of funds Congress has taxpayers make
up the difference (Hartung, 1999). For what
purpose the trainees are going to use these
weapons is seldom an issue, even if they
come from countries at war or with abomi-
nable human rights records, e.g., Indonesia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Congo, Cote dIvo-
ire. When the Indonesian military committed
human rights abuses in East Timor, Congress
banned them from IMET; but the DOD got
around that by arranging ‘‘joint exercises’’
for US and Indonesian military.
2. An Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program,
set up by the US Foreign Assistance Act in
1976, provides a mechanism whereby mili-
tary services can dispose of unwanted weap-
ons. EDA began to be used extensively after
the end of the Cold War. In spite of a fair
value requirement, the services gave 80% of
their surplus weapons away free on an ‘‘as is,
where is’’ basis (to hold down government
costs) to a vastly expanded set of eligible pur-
chasers. Soon weapons manufacturers pro-
tested that this bonanza stood in the way of
their ability to sell similar weapons new. So a
Commerce Department representative was
added to those from the Departments of
State and Defense on the EDA Coordinating
Committee to protect their market (Pineo
and Lumpe, 1996).
3. In 1997 the US House of Representatives
unanimously adopted an ‘‘Arms Sales Code
of Conduct’’ that would have allowed sales
only to democratic countries that respect
their citizens human rights, are not aggres-
sive towards other states, and participate fully
in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
This provision was killed in conference com-
mittee. And no constraints were placed on
the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) pro-
gram to distribute weapons of all kinds, usu-
ally gratis, to ‘‘friendly’’ (i.e., strategically
useful) countries, including Somalia and Iraq.
4. US statutes bar transferring weapons or mili-
tary aid to states that have been subjects of
military coups; but a special law were passed
exempting coup-governed Pakistan from
these restrictions. Similarly, anyone involved
in manufacturing, transferring, or delivering
arms is prohibited from supplying terrorist
states or regimes that display a ‘‘pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.’’ In spite of these legal hurdles,
exporters have with impunity shipped arms
to countries known to be careless about hu-
man rights as well as to non-state actors of
every sort. This is possible in part because of
loopholes in the legislation, e.g., a provision
that a financial institution is covered by
restrictions only if ‘‘directly involved’’ in a
transaction. Similarly, in 2001 the US Con-
gress wanted to commit up to $300 million
for military assistance to the Northern Alli-
ance and others in Afghanistan. Because of
their involvement in human rights violations
these groups were not eligible for such fund-
ing under existing law, so Congress inserted
‘‘notwithstanding any other provision of
law’’ in their appropriations bill.10
5. Beginning in the 1990s a number of munici-
pal governments in the US passed ordinances
to hold weapons manufacturers liable for
arms-related harm occurring within their
jurisdictions. Several states then legislated
against such ordinances; and in October 2005
two-thirds of the members of each Congres-
sional body nationalized this hold-harmless
immunization of the arms industry as The
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act, and the President promptly signed it.
6. On the international level, especially at the
UN, various efforts to establish meaningful
arms controls have so far been frustrated. As
noted above, after years of effort the ‘‘Con-
trol Arms’’ campaign was recently blocked at
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a UN conference. Four years earlier a lim-
ited-scope UN Conference on the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in
All Its Aspects also failed (Karp, 2002), in
part because participants focused not on
human rights but on arms control, to which
they assigned a low priority (Koh, 2003,
p. 2347). These setbacks, in turn, are com-
pounded by the failure of the UN Security
Council, whose permanent members are ma-
jor arms exporters, to fulfill its responsibility
under Article 26 of the UN Charter to ‘‘for-
mulat(e) ...plans to be submitted to the
Members of the United Nations for the
establishment of a system for the regulation
of armaments.’’
One constant in all these strategies is a commitment
to bolstering the arms industry, regardless of who
gets hurt or how badly (Kwithy, 1979). Perhaps it is
a jungle out there, as pro-gun lobbyists say, yet
surely the unhampered distribution of weapons is
not a civilizing factor. In particular, this process has
become so complex that the respective roles of
government agencies and private contractors are
blurred. Hobbes would perhaps understand how this
could be; but he would understand even more
clearly the need to impose order on the chaos and
assign responsibilities. Arguably this cannot be done
effectively short of removing these corporations
limited liability either by reimposing charters or even
nationalizing those that have become too autono-
mous (Cray and Drutman, 2004, 2005). Nothing of
the sort has been done in the wake of 9/11 as the
executive branch seeks monarchical domination
without undermining corporate prerogatives or
generating much opposition.
Although their country had for years maintained a
military presence in just about every part of the
world and often encountered opposition, Americans
saw themselves as the innocent victims of the high-
mortality acts committed on their soil. Lacking a
cosmopolitan perspective regarding US foreign
policy, they assumed that because they are good
people anyone who did not love them must be bad.
The US administration reinforced this simplistic
outlook by elevating a scholars assertion about a
‘‘clash of cultures’’ into a Manichean bipolarity
that supports an imperialistic foreign policy. Soon it
invaded Afghanistan, then Iraq, and threatened other
countries, associating all these endeavors with a
never defined, open-ended war on terrorism. Lar-
gely because of funding for this war the budget
deficit of the US government, on an accrual-
accounting basis, has reached $760 billion (US
Treasury, 2005; USA Today, 4 Aug. 2006), much of
which is borrowed from and depends on foreign,
especially Chinese, creditors. Many Americans stand
to lose when this untenable state of affairs reaches
crisis proportions. Who, then, stands to gain?
As in the past, the winners are the companies that
do business with and through the DOD. Defense
business is only one source of revenue for some of
these companies. Others, however, depend on a
steady input of defense contracts for their profit-
ability if not their very existence. Included among
these companies are most of the arms merchants that
have been heavily funded for over sixty years. But
due to various commercial, political, and techno-
logical changes, some new and restructured entities
are now on the scene.
During the years 1997–2003 DOD worked with a
budget totaling over $900 billion. Over half of this
total was spent on tens of thousands of private
contractors who entered into some 2.2 million
contracts. Eighty percent of these procurement
dollars went to just 737 contractors; all but a hun-
dred of them are American-owned. Over half of
these awards now go for services rather than goods.
The fifty biggest contractors took in more than half
the money, and the top ten got 38 percent.11 Only
one of these companies, Science Applications
International, won its contracts through, in Penta-
gon terms, ‘‘full and open’’ competition. The pre-
ferred approach to gaining contracts is via campaign
contributions and lobbying, both of which benefit
from the endemic ‘‘revolving door’’ contacts of
professional lobbyists.12Embedded in these data is a
huge structural change in the defense industry during
the 1990s, namely, its compression into just a few
major players. This industry, which included some
25 major contractors early in the decade, has since
been reduced to just two giants, Boeing and Lock-
heed Martin, two other major contractors that
are still trying to remain independent, Raytheon
and Northrop Grumman, and a number of
subcontractors and niche companies. This unprece-
dented reorganization was effected via mergers paid
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for by taxpayers and by the thousands of American
workers who were the victims of outsourcing to
China and Saudi Arabia just a few years after the
major players had emphasized job maintenance in
the 1992 election campaign. The most important of
these mergers involved Boeings purchase of
Rockwell Internationals space and engine divisions
in 1996 and its purchase of McDonnell Douglas in
1997. As a result of such changes at Boeing, this
company is now the largest US arms exporter (60%
of its sales are to other countries). It so controls the
Export-Import Bank that this institution is com-
monly referred to as the ‘‘Bank of Boeing,’’ and its
business connections with China have given it the
single most important influence on US China policy
(Parrish, 1999).
Boeings singular prominence warrants briefly
chronicling its role as a microcosm of the industry as
a whole. Though heavily engaged in commercial
business, it has consistently depended on DOD for a
large percentage of its revenues, e.g., in 2004, 57%
of its revenues came from sales of military aircraft
and weapons systems [AP, 28 Apr. 2004].) To garner
this business it relies heavily on lobbyists, whose
contract-seeking practices have periodically im-
mersed the company in scandal. Recently, for
example, the post- 9/11 ‘‘Boeing Boondoggle’’
emerged out of a provision in the December 2001
Pentagon appropriation bill authorizing the Air
Force to lease a hundred 767 commercial jets at
$20 million per jet to use as refueling tankers – at a
cost greater than the cost of purchasing the aircraft
outright. Some heads rolled, the project was put on
hold, and contractors began formulating plane
replacement proposals. Boeing is now fighting a
proposal to discontinue purchases of its C-17 cargo
planes ($200 million each) by pushing the unem-
ployment button; and it looks forward to installing
(as yet unreliable) antimissile interceptors in Poland
to knock out (hypothetical) incoming missiles from
Iran. And the sky would indeed be the limit if the
US government does give China favored nation
status as Boeing has been recommending so it can
sell a vast fleet of planes there.13
The post-9/11 world has also introduced some
new bidders for government contracts to provide
products and services that will supposedly enhance
US citizens security. One major funding source in
this new configuration is the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), which the Bush
administration initially opposed but has learned to
love. DHS buys all sorts of purportedly safety-
enhancing products from companies whose top
personnel come increasingly from this new agency,
where they earned far less than they do now in the
private sector. Another newcomer is the foreign-
based but largely American-owned arms manufac-
turer (e.g., the UKs BAE Systems) that challenges
so-called Buy America rules and the domestic/for-
eign distinction by locating a plant in the US and/or
buying US companies (NYT, 18 and 19 June 2006,
27 Sept. 2005).
From the perspective of the investors in and
(surviving) employees of these companies, the
ability of arms manufacturers to maintain a cozy
relationship with US government funding sources is
surely good news. But the victims of US military
adventures, including taxpayers and US troops
abroad, may not agree. Moreover, the DOD is
both corrupt and incompetent as it goes about the
business of fighting the war on terror. As reported
by the Government Accounting Office (2006, p.
2), the DOD is vulnerable to contracting fraud,
waste, and abuse (mismanagement) by virtue of
weaknesses in each of five areas: ‘‘senior leadership,
capable acquisitions workforce, adequate pricing,
appropriate contracting approaches and techniques,
and sufficient contract surveillance.’’ Because of
these weaknesses, no one in the Pentagon is held
accountable when authorized weapons systems are
not produced within designated time frames, or
when their development goes as much as 50% over
budget, or when such cost overruns require either
reducing the number of units to be built or
expanding defense spending beyond all rational
limits. Contractors seem not to mind, though,
because they are routinely paid regardless of their
performance. This situation now has some mem-
bers of Congress concerned enough to consider
better oversight (NYT, 11 July 2006). But US
government spokespersons divert attention from
such problems by focusing rhetorically on the
militarys salvific mission. The mass media, now
much more corporately controlled than during
the Vietnam era or the Reagan administration,
collaborate.
In short, the US national treasure is being ex-
pended for the sake of a comparatively small sector
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of the population, namely, people who benefit
directly or indirectly from policies that commit
two-thirds of the discretionary federal budget to
‘‘national defense.’’ From within that budgetary
bubble, some controversy is aroused when the ritual
of stateside base closings is underway, and now also
when the DHS announces its state-by-state distri-
bution of counter-terrorism funds. But these eco-
nomic concerns are embedded in a culture that exalts
the quality-of-life benefits that flow from militarism,
however unfounded this perception might be
(Michalos, 1989).
What these factual data reveal, unfortunately, is
that the American people are accustomed to letting
militaristic rhetoric trump moral concerns. When
the mantra of national defense is sounded they see no
moral issue to address despite the concentration of
tax-derived funds on the arms industry. Yet what US
taxpayers contribute to this industry is second only
to their support of agriculture. Some elected repre-
sentatives have dared ask why. Not only to protect
people, industry spokespersons reply, but to give
them good jobs. Perhaps so, but whatever employ-
ment the industry provides could be accomplished
just as well by subsidies to other industries. Besides,
the actual number of citizens employed is minimized
by offsets (on-site manufacturing) and outsourcing to
client buyers abroad.
Neither capitalist nor communist ideology could
defend this boondoggle in the name of national
defense. But so long as the world and its inhabitants
do not go up in a mushroom cloud, Americans seem
unperturbed by the many lesser cataclysms effected
in their name – by, e.g., cluster bombs, computer
guided missiles, and helicopter gun ships. This moral
blindness is understandable considering how care-
fully it is being crafted, partly by politicians and
media but perhaps even more by arms industry
advertisers and lobbyists. In some quarters this situ-
ation might be regarded as a criminal conspiracy. But
Westphalian mythology diverts peoples attention
from the efforts of peace-oriented NGOs to impose
humanitarian values on the military weapons
industry. Considering this industrys performance
with respect to either the CSR profitability
requirement or the CSR use of political power
requirement, companies in the arms industry should
not be immune from liability by virtue of their
relationship to a (debatably) sovereign state.
Conclusion
I have found that the US arms industry is in violation
of CSR standards regarding the environment, social
equity, profitability, and use of political power. This
finding is of no concern to anyone unable to look
beyond Westphalian assumptions, which render a
violence facilitator blameless if it is acting at the
behest of a sovereign government. But if these
assumptions are disallowed an arms manufacturer
should not be able to disavow its CSR inadequacies
by simply pointing to government priorities.
In a blueprint Westphalian nation-state, the
government exercises hegemony over violence
whether within or beyond its borders. In practice,
though, this hegemony is not wholly the prerogative
of government. In the US an arguably individual-
oriented constitutional right to bear arms renders the
governments designations of friends and foes irrel-
evant in the absence, say, of some felonious behavior
or terrorist connections (Cottrol, 1994). But pre-
cisely because of this libertarian bias regarding
weapons possession in the US, a case can be made
that in the domestic market arms manufacturers are
not just agents but are principals in the provision of
weapons to users. Similarly, given the political
power of US arms manufacturers and the defects in
US government controls over arms transfers, some
liability for the harm caused by US-produced
weapons that are used abroad should be assigned to
their manufacturers if the latter arrange transfers
knowing the likely consequences of their action.
Assigning liability to arms manufacturers for harm
caused at home or abroad seems, then, altogether
appropriate if the range of their activity in a political
system manifests a high degree of autonomy. This
contention would be challenged, of course, by
anyone who is persuaded that whatever arms man-
ufacturers produce is for the sake of national defense.
It would also be challenged by anyone who ques-
tions the propriety of treating use of political power
as a CSR criterion. Can these challenges be taken
seriously, though, if their proponents do not offer
some alternative way to address the violations of
human rights that these companies products facili-
tate? The immensity of such violations would be
incalculable if brought about by major weapons
systems, but these are now built more for corporate
revenue than for actual military use. Human rights
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violations are, however, being brought about de
facto with small arms, which are being used far too
much without justification.
So whether we contextualize this problem of
liability within or beyond the nation-state, a cor-
poration should not be said to be acting responsibly
if it unhesitatingly transfers weapons to any group
expressing a need whether government guidelines
preclude the transfer or not. For, these weapons are
rarely placed in museums as objets dart. Rather do
their purchasers use them as means to power and
wealth over the bodies of anyone who stands in their
way. This blood-drenched reality suggests a need to
reconsider the justification for assigning limited lia-
bility to any corporation regardless of its products
negative externalities. The present system of token
government oversight is, in short, no substitute for
comprehensive cost-benefit analyses and human
rights standards that take peoples lives and well-
being into account. If such constraints were in place
and could avoid capture by those it regulated, at least
small arms manufacturers and traders would be seen
for what they are and what they constructively in-
tend to be: facilitators of death and destruction.
Notes
1 To economists, an externality is any effect of a
transaction between two parties on a third party who is
not involved in the carrying out of that transaction. If
the externality is a benefit it is positive; if it is a cost, it
is negative. Some consider only externalities from one
market to another (e.g., reduction of fish population
due to pesticide runoff from a farm). As I use this term
it extends beyond identifiable markets to anything of
value, human or not, even if not readily quantifiable.
2 NYT here and hereafter stands for The New York
Times, and Econ for The Economist. Other news sources
to be cited are: Business Week, BW; Associated Press,
AP; International Herald-Tribune; IHT; In These Times,
ITT; World Press Review, WPR.
3 Elan (2004, p. 25), Dex Media (2003), Genelabs
Technologies, Inc. (2004), Northwestern Energy
(2005), Reinhold (n.d., p. 8), Starwood Hotels and
Resorts Worldwide, Inc. (2004, sect. 20, pp. 47–48)
and Thomson (n.d.).
4 Fifth Third Bank (2001), Ballard Power Systems,
Inc. (n.d., 4.0 and 5.0), Cabot Oil and Gas Corp.
(2005, sect. V). Dynegy (2004), Global Crossing (2005),
Lucent Technologies (n.d.), NiSource (n.d., Workplace
IV) and State Farm (2006).
5 The US defense budget came to $538–48 billion in
2004 but grows to $765.5 billion if one includes other
defense-related expenditures that are funded outside the
Department of Defense, e.g., in the Department of En-
ergy (nuclear weapons) or the Veterans Administration.
That year total expenditures for defense in the rest of
the world came to $509 billion. see SIPRI, 2005, p.
310; Brauer and Anglewicz 2005; Wheeler 2006.
6 Econ, 23 July, 4 June, and 12 Feb. 1994, 18 Dec.
1993, 23 March 1991; BW, 13 June 1994; ITT, 11 July
1994; WPR, Sept. 1992.
7 ITT, 11 July 1994, 15 Nov. 1993, 13 June 1994;
BW, 9 Nov. 1992; NYT, 20 Sept. 1992; 17 Feb. 1992;
2 Feb. 1992.
8 BW, 20 Sept. 1993, p. 88; NYT, 17 Jan. 1993,
p. 3:1 + ; 4 Oct. 1992, p. F5; 9 Dec. 1990, p. F5;
WSJ, 15 July 1994, p. A1+.
9 Sunday Times (London), 26 Nov. 1989; Independent
(London), 22 Jan. 1990; Figaro, 3–4 March 1990;
7 March 1990; 5 March 1990; IHT, 6 Feb. 1990.
10 The statutes at issue here were: Sections 116 and 502b
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; Section 508 of the
FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act; Section
40 of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C.
sect 2778(b), as amended 1996; and the Leahy Amendment
to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Defense Appropria-
tion Act. See Amnesty International, 2006, pp. 5, 35.
11 These top ten contractors and the amounts of their
contracts over FY 1998–2003 were (not counting joint
venture income): Lockheed-Martin ($94 billion), Boeing
($81.6 billion), Raytheon ($39.9 billion), Northrop
Grumman ($33.9 billion), General Dynamics ($33.2 bil-
lion), United Technologies ($17.8 billion), General Elec-
tric ($10.6 billion), Science Applications International
($10.5 billion), and Newport News Shipbuilding
($8.8 billion), now owned by Northrop-Grumman.
12 Four of the top six spenders on lobbying over the five-
year period (the others being Altria and AT&T) were top
defense contractors: General Electric ($88.million), Lockheed
Martin ($71.5 million), Boeing ($64.4 million), and Northrop
Grumman ($61.2 million) (Knott, 2004; Makinson, 2004).
13 NYT, 22 and 24 May 2006; Mobile Press-Register,
13 June 2006.
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